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Independent Verification and Validation for 
Space Shuttle Flight Software 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Committee for Review of Oversight Mechanisms for Space Shuttle Flight Software 
was asked by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Office of Space 
Flight to determine the need to continue independent verification and validation (IV&V) for 
Space Shuttle flight software.# The Committee found that the current IV&V process is 
necessary to maintain NASA's stringent safety and quality requirements for man-rated vehicles. 
Therefore, the Committee does not support NASA's plan to eliminate funding for the IV&V 
effort in fiscal year 1993. The Committee believes that the Space Shuttle software development 
process is not adequate without IV&V and that elimination of IV&V as currently practiced will 
adversely affect the overall quality and safety of the software, both now and in the future. 
Furthermore, the Committee was told that no organization within NASA has the expertise or the 
manpower to replace the current IV&V function in a timely fashion, nor will building this 
. expertise elsewhere necessarily reduce cost. Thus, the Committee does not recommend moving 
IV&V functions to other organizations within NASA unless the current IV&V is maintained for 
as long as it takes to build comparable expertise in the replacing organization. 
INTRODUCTION 
In early 199 1, NASA's Office of Space Flight commissioned the Aeronautics and Space 
Engineering Board of the National Research Council (NRC) to investigate the adequacy of the 
current process by which NASA develops and verifies Space Shuttle flight software. In January 
1992, the Board convened the Committee for Review of Oversight Mechanisms for Space Shuttle 
Flight Software Processes to evaluate the adequacy of the process from initial requirements 
definition to final machine loading. The Committee was given until the end of 1992 to complete 
its investigation and prepare a final report. 
One of the issues the Space Shuttle program office requested that the Committee 
specifically consider was the office's pending decision to eliminate the IV&V function currently 
' It should be noted that the Committee was specifidy asked not to evalupte the performance of the current 
IV&V contractor, Intermetria, or its ~1bcontnctor at the Marshall Space Flight Center, Smith Advanced 
Technologies, but rather to concentrate on the need to continue the function they serve. 
performed on the Shuttle flight software at an annual cost of $3.2 million. The IV&V function 
was instituted, in part, as a result of a recommendation of a previous NRC committee evaluating 
post-Challenger Space Shuttle risk assessment and management. The Shuttle program office now 
believes that the flight software and the processes that are used to develop and verify updates 
are sufficiently mature to permit a phase-out of the contractors that perform IV&V. Eliminating 
this function is primarily a cost-saving move, but one that the Shuttle program office believes 
is justified by the overall quality of the processes and personnel that are in place to maintain the 
software. In short, the Shuttle program office believes that the process is adequate without 
IV&V and the money may be better spent in other ways. 
Because the IV&V function is currently scheduled to be eliminated by October 1992, the 
Office of Space Flight requested that the Committee first address whether there is a need to 
continue this function and later address other aspects of the flight software development process. 
Thus, the Committee focused on this issue in its fust four meetings, and this report addresses 
the Committee's findings and conclusions on this one issue. The final report, which will 
examine other aspects of the flight software development process, will be available near the end 
of 1992. 
BACKGROUND 
Flight software is defined as the software that is loaded into the on-board computers for 
control of the Shuttle during launch, on-orbit operations, entry, and landing. The primary flight 
software consists of approximately 500,000 lines of source code in almost 400 compilable units, 
while the backup software is approximately 90,000 lines of code. The software has evolved over 
many years of operation to require a complex maintenance and upgrade process involving 
numerous contractor and NASA organizations at a cost of well over $100 million per year.2 
Upgrades are performed on a continuing basis (approximately one per year) to provide new 
functions and to fix the errors that are still being identified. Because it controls so many aspects 
of the Shuttle's operations, flight software is deemed by the Shuttle program to be a critical item 
for safety and reliability. 
Following the Challenger accident in 1986, a number of assessments were made of the 
overall safety of the Shuttle program, many of which addressed software verification and 
validation as part of their investigations. These included evaluations by the Rogers Commission; 
an NRC committee; the House of Representatives' Committee on Science, Space, and 
Technology; and the General Accounting Office (GAO). 
The Committee was told that the yearly cost for the flight software development contractors (new 
development, maintenance, software dguntim ccintroi, etc.) was approximately $60 million. Opmtio11 of the 
Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory, which is used to test the flight so!lwarc, requires npproxhably $24 million 
per year. This total does not include costs for mftware dgura t i011 ,  developmnt d mointcnance of Spree 
Shuttle Main Engine software, and other support colltractom. 
The Rogers Commission3 concentrated on the direct causes of the Challenger accident, 
but Appendix F of their report included a statement by Richard Feynman, one of the members 
of the commission, that pertained specifically to the flight software, ". . . there have been recent 
suggestions by [NASA] management to curtail . . . elaborate and expensive tests as being 
unnecessary at this late date in Shuttle history. This must be resisted, for it does not appreciate 
the mutual subtle influences and sources of error generated by even small changes to one part 
of a program on another. w4 
Among the recommendations of the Rogers Commission was that NASA review certain 
aspects of its Shuttle risk assessment effort and ". . . identify those items that must be improved 
prior to flight to ensure mission success and flight safety." It further recommended that an audit 
panel be appointed by the NRC to verify the adequacy of the effort and report directly to the 
Administrator of NASA. 
This audit panel was convened by the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board of the 
NRC in 1986, and its final report, dated January 1988, concluded that "In general, hardware 
certification and verification, and software validation and verification in STS [Space 
Transportation System] are managed and conducted primarily by the same organizational 
elements responsible for the design and fabrication of the units. Thus, the independence of the 
certification, validation, and verification processes is questionable. For example, . . . 
'Independent' validation and verification (IV&V) of software is carried out by the same 
contractor (IBM) that produces the STS software, with some checks being made by the Johnson 
Space Center. "' 
The NRC committee recommended that "Responsibility for approval of hardware 
certification and software IV&V should be vested in entities separate from the NSTS mational 
Space Transportation System] Program structure and the centers directly involved in STS 
development and operation. " 
In March 1988, the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, echoing the 
concerns expressed in the NRC report, recommended that NASA establish IV&V to evaluate the 
development and modification of Shuttle software. Based on these two recommendations, in 
May 1988 NASA expanded an existing contract with Inteetrics, Inc., and instituted the current 
IV&V function. The original IV&V contract with Intermetrics supported 40 people; recently, 
the support has been reduced to 24 people, at an approximate annual cost of $3.2 million. Table 
1 shows the functions that were encompassed by the original @person effort and the 
corresponding functions addressed by the present, reduced level of effort. The current plan by 
NASA will completely eliminate IV&V for all the functions shown in Table 1. 
In February 1990, the House Committee requested that the GAO determine NASA's 
Pmrt of the Presidential w s s i o n  on the S ~ a c e  Shuttle Challenger Accident, by William P. Rogers, 
Chairman (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1986). 
Feynman, R. P., 'Personal Observations on Reliability of Shuttle," Appendix F of the Remrt of the 
Presidential Commission on the Srwct Shuttle Challenner Accident, by William P. Rogers, ChPirmPn (Wd-, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986). 
5 post llenner Evaluation of Srwct Shuttle Risk Assessment and Maaan emeat, by Altm D. Slay, Chairman ' 
of the Committee on Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit (Washington, D.C.: National Academy 
Press, 1988). 
TABLE 1 Functions Covered by the IV&V Contractors 
Redundancy management 
Launch processing systems 
Documentatiw-onIy Change Requests 
Flight software tools 
I-Load to K-load Change Requests 
SOURCE: Intennetrics 
progress in improving independent oversight of Shuttle software development. The GAO 
report,6 dated February 1991, recommended that NASA "require independent V&V 
Werification and Validation] for Shuttle software, bearing in mind the views of the .mC, the 
House Committee, the [NASA Space Shuttle] software steering group,? and NASA-wide 
guidance, and ensure that the independent V&V organization is outside the control of the Shuttle 
program office. " 
In requesting the current review of the IV&V process, the Shuttle program office has 
stated that if funding were not an issue they would continue with a robust IV&V program. 
However, if it can be shown that the current implementation of IV&V does not appreciably 
reduce risk, or that its cost cannot be justified by the risk it avoids, it can reasonably be 
eliminated. The Shuttle program office does not believe that these issues were adequately 
addressed by previous studies, which did not have the benefit of recent efforts to document the 
current V&V process. 
To investigate the question of whether to continue N&V, the Committee heard 
- - - 
United States General Aammting Office, 
Software Develo~ment (Washington, D.C.: United SWes Gczlenl Aammting Office, 1991). 
' ?he softwrue steering group consisted of officials from the Johnson Space Center, the Kennedy Sprrce Center, 
the Marshall Space Flight Carter, NASA Hcadqurbfs, the software development contractors, and the Spoce 
Tnnspo~m System Opercrtions Contractor. The group met once to ddress the need to bring .bout changes in 
NASA's software development and esmvaace processes but did not produce f d  recommendations. 
presentations from the Shuttle program office, the software development contractors, the current 
IV&V contractors, and several outside organizations and experts, including the U. S. Air Force 
and Navy. The Committee also reviewed extensive documentation and data provided by NASA 
and the contractors describing both the independent and "embedded"' verification and validation 
processes. The following sections present the findings of the Committee along with a 
recommendation regarding the continuation of IV&V on the Shuttle software. It should be noted 
that the Committee was specifically asked not to evaluate the performance of the current IV&V 
contractor, Intermetrics, -or its subcontractor at the Marshall Space Flight Center, Smith 
Advanced Technologies, but rather to concentrate on the need to continue the function the 
contractors serve. This proved to be a difficult restriction because the argument for continued 
IV&V hinges partly on the capabilities these two companies bring to the process. 
Based on this investigation, the Committee concluded that the current IV&V process 
is necessary- to maintain NASA's stringent safety and quality requirements for man-rated 
vehicles. Therefore, the Committee does not support NASA's plan to eliminate funding for 
the IV&V effort in f-1 year 1993. The Committee believes that the Space Shuttle 
software development process is not adequate without IV&V and that elimination of IV&V 
as currently practiced will adversely affect the overall quality and safety of the software, 
both now and in the future. 
This report focuses solely on the need to continue IV&V. A complete discussion of the 
embedded process will appear in the Committee's frnal report. Regarding the issue of continuing 
N&V, the Committee's evaluations are based on answers to the following questions: 
1. Does the current approach to IV&V improve the quality of the software beyond 
what the embedded process alone provides? 
2. Does the improvement justify the cost? 
3. Will NASA's proposed alternatives to N&V provide the- same benefits for a 
lower cost? 
The following sections present the Committee's findings and recommendations with 
respect to these questions. 
THE BENEFITS OF IV&V 
The flight software development process is described in detail in a document recently 
prepared by Intermetrics and approved by the Space Shuttle program ~ f f i c e . ~  This document 
discusses what NASA calls its "embedded" process, which excludes the N&V effort. It is the 
The term "embedded V&Vn was coined recently by the Shuttle program office in their argument to eliminate 
IV&V. In the Committee's judgement, it is equivalent to what is commonly referred to by industry as simply 
'verification aud validation. ' 
N a t i d  Aeronautics aud Spscc Administm!im, Suace Shuttle Flight Software Verification and Validation 
&xiuirements, NSTS-08271 (Houston, Texas: Johnson Space Center, 1991). 
understanding of the Committee that if the IV&V function were to continue, it would do so in 
addition to the embedded process described in the above document. 
The embedded process provides a number of checks and rigorous configuration control 
mechanisms. Ultimately, however, the embedded process relies on the development 
contractors1° to perform their internal verification and validation correctly, and on an extensive 
set of system integration test simulations to expose any potential problems. Once a change to 
the software" is agreed upon by all members of the flight software community,12 the 
development contractors perform their work according to their own established procedures. 
Later, when the development contractors have completed their internal tests, the software is 
released to the flight software community for additional testing. The Committee believes that 
the organizations involved are truly concerned with producing the best software possible and has 
found them willing to discuss any and all aspects of the process (within bounds of proprietary 
information)-at any time. The Committee was particularly struck by the degree of teamwork 
that is shown in addressing problems and believes this emphasis on openness and consensus is 
one of the strengths of the process. Furthermore, the process is relatively mature and each 
organization knows its role and has much experience performing it. The Committee's full report 
will include a complete discussion and evaluation of the embedded process. 
In examining the need for continuing the IV&V function, the Committee identified four 
areas where the embedded process clearly benefits from the on-going independent technical 
assessment. The Committee believes that the current implementati~n of W&V: 
Provides a broad penpective: As mentioned above, the embedded process relies heavily on the 
development contractors (IBM, Rockwell, and Rocketdyne) to perform their internal verification 
and validation correctly. This is appropriate and reflects the approach used throughout the 
industry, as well as in the U. S. Air Force and Navy software development procedures. 
However, the development contractors have incentive to consider only those components with 
which they are specifically concerned. This lack of broad perspective makes it more likely that 
errors will slip through in areas that do not fit any particular organization's responsibility. The 
IV&V function is specifically chartered to provide this broad perspective. For example, the 
current flight software IV&V contractor has been particularly active in addressing issues that 
relate to the interface between the primary avionics software (developed by IBM) and the backup 
flight software (developed by Rockwell) and has identified several potentially serious errors 
'O IBM is the development ctmtracta for the primary avionics software system, Rockwell develops the backup 
flight software, and Rocketdyne is responsible fw the main e q h e  ccmtroller software. 
" Changes are implemented though Change Requests (a), which rue r e q d  to enhance the functionality 
of the software, and Discnp.ncy Reports (DRs), which describe errors in the so- that require action. 
" The flight softwrue community includes all the organhtions within the Shuttle ptogram that have an iuterest 
in the development, verification, or perfinnmnce of the software. This includes mpmmtatives from the Mission 
Operations, Flight Cnw, and Engineering Directorates at the Jdhason Spnce Centsr, NASA's Sam md Mission 
Quality Office; the software development C O Q ~ ~  (IBM ind Rochell Interaatiwrri); the opedons cuntractors 
(also IBM and Rockwell); the Shuttle system design coatndon, (Lockheed and Charles Stark Drsper Labs); and 
the IV&V contractor (Intermetrics). At the Marshall Space Flight Center, this includes the NASA persannel, the 
development ccmtmctor (Rockddpc), md the IV&V c o a ~  (Smith Advnnced Technologice) that develop the 
Spnce Shuttle main engine controller software. 
(discussed in the next section) that were not caught by the embedded process. 
Maintains vigilance over the quality of the process: The Committee believes that the reliance 
on the development contractors to perform their internal process is appropriate. Also, except 
for the previous comment regarding a broad perspective, the embedded process includes 
numerous checks on the development contractor's products to ensure that safe, reliable software 
is produced. For these checks to work, however, they must continue to be performed with 
diligence, aggressiveness,'skill, and integrity. Unfortunately, there is increasing risk that the 
quality of the software will degrade as it is changed. Over a long period of time, a mechanism 
that provides an independent technical review will significantly enhance the embedded process. 
OBsets the erosion of expertise: Developing software, particularly software as complex and 
specialized as that for the Shuttle avionics, requires considerable specific expertise and 
correspondingly sophisticated tools. It is not enough to design a process that covers all aspects 
of the problem, the expertise and capabilities that are built up over a period of years need to be 
maintained.13 Many of the original developers of the Shuttle flight software have already gone 
on to other projects, and the perception that the flight software is mature indicates that in the 
future it will be difficult to retain many of the highly competent software engineers and 
managers that are currently involved in the process. According to statements by several of the 
NASA and contractor managers interviewed during the Committee's investigation, programs that 
involve a greater degree of new development, such as the Space Station Freedom and the 
National Launch System, will likely continue to attract experienced personnel away from the 
Shuttle program. Continued steps must be taken to maintain skills and provide additional checks 
on the process. Independent oversight is a partial solution, but only if the group that performs 
the oversight also provides a significant level of experience and technical capability. 
Avoids bias and peer pressure: The emphasis on consensus that is evident in the embedded 
process is admirable, but the Committee believes it brings with it the possibility that individual 
assessments of important issues can be stifled through peer pressure, through the desire to 
protect organizational interests, or through the simple desire to make the process run smoothly. 
Furthermore, when a problem is recognized and an initial solution is proposed, particularly when 
it is proposed by a customer, it often serves to bias further thinking on the subject towards that 
initial solution. While the Committee has found no instances where this type of contamination 
or stifling has occurred, it believes that the risk is significant without some degree of oversight 
that is explicitly designed to be independent. 
In discussions with the Committee, IBM has estimated that it takes at least two years for new employees to 
adequately understand the Shuttle flight soffware. Estimates obtained from the contractors regding the experience 
of theu current personnel specific to Shuttle software are as follows: IBM has 153 workers with an average 
experience of 13 years, RochveII has 85 workers with an average of 7.8 years of experience, and Intermetrics has 
24 people who average 6.7 years of experience with Shuttle systems and 14.9 years of avionicsIsoftware experience. 
IV&V IN THE SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM 
Independent verification and validation of software has been used by industry for over 
twenty years in many different forms-tailored by the user's need, the complexity of the system, 
the criticality of the system's application, and budget and schedule constraints. In NASA's 
current implementation of IV&V in the Space Shuttle program, the contractors responsible for 
IV&V are involved in the process from the beginning, provide a high level of technical expertise 
and knowledge of the software, and are specifically charged to consider the safety and quality 
of the product, as opposed to simply checking the performance of the process. Because of this, 
they are able to provide an indepth evaluation of the components they inspect. Unfortunately, 
due to the limited funding available, the full potential benefits have not been realized. Still, 
despite the limited resources, the Committee has found that the current implementation of IV&V 
in the Shuttle program is valuable and effective. The NASA Shuttle program office 
 acknowledge^ that the IV&V effort, as practiced on the Shuttle flight software, has been valuable 
and effective. 
The IV&V contractors have identified errors, including several Severity 1 errors,14 that 
were not found by the embedded process. Among the 37 Discrepancy Reports authored or 
prompted by the IV&V contractors s h e  the beginning of their contract, there were 12 Severity 
1 errors and 3 Severity 1N errors. Also, the development contractors and NASA personnel 
interviewed by the Committee agree that other errors have been found or avoided through the 
close interaction of the IV&V teams with the software developers throughout the development 
process. Although the IV&V contractors are, by definition, independent, they interact with the 
software developers and other members of the flight software community throughout the process 
through their evaluation of Change Requests and Discrepancy Reports, through routine 
discussions with the developers, and ultimately through participation in the Shuttle Avionics 
Software Control Board, which is the final arbiter of software changes. 
Although the current IV&V personnel are an integral part of the team, and so may be 
subject in part to peer pressure and potentially faulty group solutions, they provide a broad-based 
viewpoint and are specifically chartered to question group solutions from an independent stance. 
For example, the IV&V function specifically maintains an effort to examine the ways in which 
various parts of the primary and backup software interact. Included in the 37 Discrepancy 
Reports mentioned above were 4 Severity 1 reports on problems occurring between the primary 
and backup software. One of these involved a scenario that could have caused shutdown of all 
the Shuttle's main engines. The other three involved errors that could have caused the loss of 
the orbiter and crew if the backup software was needed during an ascent abort maneuver. 
Ultimately, the value of the IV&V function, as it relates to the embedded process, is 
Shuttle flight software errois are cakgorized by the severity of theii poteatial c o n s e q u m  without re& 
to the likelihood of their occwrence. Severity 1 errors am defined re errom tha! could produce a loss of the Sprce 
Shuttle or its crew. Severity 2 errois cm offed the Shuttle's abiity to complete its mission objectives, while 
Severity 3 errors affect procedures for which altereatives, or wokamds, exist. Severity 4 and 5 errors consist 
of very minor coding or docume~ltation errors. In addition, there is a class of Severity 1 errors, ulled Severity IN, 
which, while potentially life-threotening, involves operations that am precluded by established procedures, are 
beyond the physical limitations of Shuttle systems, or on outside system failurn prdectim levels. 
dependent on the-aggressiveness and skill (e.g., the expertise, tools, and corporate knowledge) 
with which the IV&V contractors perform their work and their ability to remain independent and 
unbiased. The Committee understands that NASA's current plan is to eliminate the IV&V 
function but to retain a small portion of the systems engineering capability currently performed 
by the IV&V contractors. It is clear, however, that much valuable and probably irreplaceable 
expertise will be lost in scaling down to a lower level of effort, and the ability of the process 
to identify errors and determine appropriate solutions will be reduced. The Committee questions 
whether there are enough -people assigned to this task at the present time. If the personnel are 
reduced further, the result may be that the entire effort becomes ineffective. 
COST/BENEFTI' CONSIDERATIONS 
Even if a process is effective, there may be justifiable cosvbenefit reasons for eliminating 
it. If the cost of the service exceeds its value, it should be eliminated. Clearly, the cost of the 
Intermetrics contract (which encompasses the work done by Smith Advanced Technologies) is 
a factor in the pending decision to eliminate N&V. In an era when NASA is experiencing little 
real growth in its overall budget, and given the internal pressure to reduce costs associated with 
the Shuttle program, it is understandable that the Shuttle program office would seek to unburden 
itself of the current $3.2 million annual cost for IV&V. However, a true definition of the cost 
of eliminating IV&V must include the consequences of a fdure of the software that results in 
a loss of life, causes the loss of a Sh~ttle,'~ produces a standdown of Shuttle operations, or 
causes the loss of expensive hardware. In proportion to the potential losses, the cost of IV&V 
is clearly justified. The question reduces to one of determining where risk reduction resources 
are best placed when competing uses are possible. 
Accurately assessing the risk of software-related accidents, or judging the risks of such 
accidents in comparison with other possible sources of risk, is not possible. Because a single 
error is sufficient to cause a serious accident, a decrease in the number of software errors 
detected is not a valid measure for confidence in the safety of the software or the process. Nor 
is the fact that no Shuttle accidents have resulted from software errors a cause for complacency. 
A more valid measure of risk is the fact that the IV&V effort has detected potentially 
catastrophic errors not caught by the embedded process. The recent incident aboard ~ndeavor'~ 
should serve as a warning that software, even at this stage in its life, can contain critical errors 
and that new errors can be introduced whenever the software is altered, Accidents, including, 
l5 NASA has estimated that the Shuttle Endeavor, which was a replacement for Challenger, cost approximately 
$2 billion. 
'' A loss of expensive hardware nearly occurred during the recat (5112192) maiden flight of Endeavor (STS- 
49) as the crew attempted to mdezvous with and repair the Intelsat satellite. The software routhe used to calculate 
rendezvous firings failed to converge to a solution due to a mismatch between the precision of the state-vector 
variables, which describe the position and velocity of the Shuttle, and the limits used to bound the calculation. The 
state-vector variables were double p i s i o n  while the limit variables were single precision. The rescue mission was 
nearly aborted, but a workaround was found that involved relaying an appropriate state-vector value from tbe 
ground. 
TABLE 2 Operational Increment Change History 
gn of abort seq-r, lengine 
- 
SOURCE: NASA Office of Space Flight 
Percentages based on the combined opproxhate sites of the primary avionics software system (500,000 lines of 
code) and the backup flight softwuc (90,000 iines of code). 
in particular, Challenger, result at least in part from complacency arising from lack of problems 
in the past and the corresponding relaxation of protection mechanisms and  procedure^, 
Overconfidence in software is common and usually unwise. 
The fact that the Shuttle software has yet to cause a serious loss is due primarily to the 
diligence of NASA and its contractors. Without this digence, software could easily have 
caused serious, perhaps lifethreatening and program-threatening problems. The Committee 
believes that elimination of IV&V at this stage in the program would serve to erode this 
diligence. 
The potential risk reduction functions of IV&V are particularly important in light of the 
proposed changesi7 to Shuttle hardware and operations and the likely effects on the software. 
Although it may seem that software reliability and safety should increase over time, this is not 
necessarily true; as software changes, its structure degrades and, over time, the people who were 
responsible for initial development of the software move on to other programs or retire. These 
two factors make it increasingly difficult to change the software without introducing errors. 
Each new release of the Shuttle flight software includes significant additions to increase 
functionality or to fix errors that have been identified. Table 2 shows the number of lines of 
source code that were changed in each update (called "operational increments," or 01s) during 
the ten years of Shuttle operations. The two most recent updates (01-20 and 01-21) included 
very significant changes to the code (4.7 percent and 5.4 percent of the total, respectively). The 
error experienced on the recent mission of Endeavor was introduced into the software as part 
of 01-21. In addition, both modified and aging hardware can create conditions not accounted 
for in the software. Experience has shown that it is in this environment that errors are most 
likely to be introduced and that off-nominal situations are most likely to arise. For example, 
when the software's original 16-bit addressing was changed to a new 20-bit format to take 
advantage of capabilities in the new general purpose computer (OI-8F), programmers incorrectly 
used address bits that were reserved for the processor's microcode. Executing these instructions 
would have caused branches to unknown locations. The IV&V contractors authored 5 
Discrepancy Reports that identified illegal use of these address fields.'' Thus, although it 
seems paradoxical, the risk of a software-related accident may very well increase as software 
evolves. 
Considering the continued risk of a software failure, the consequences of a failure, and 
the benefits gained through IV&V, the cost of maintaining IV&V is small. Furthermore, the 
Committee has heard no specific proposals for alternative uses of the money that would be wiser 
than continuing W&V as it is currently implemented. Proposals presented to the Committee, 
such as the implementation of the new HAWS compiler and the Enhanced Software Product 
Assurance program proposed by the Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance office at the 
Johnson Space Center, were judged to be less important. Thus, it is the opinion of the 
Committee that the current implementation of W&V provides important, low-cost insurance to 
the Shuttle program that materially reduces the risk of a software failure and, thus, of a 
software-related accident. 
'' In mqoase to a written questioa from the Committee, NASA has stated that over the next five years several 
major changes to Shuttle hadware will be made. These include: the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor to replace the 
cutrent solid rocket motot; the Mul t i -Woa Electronic Display System to replace the current displays and 
k e y M ,  implemcatation of the Global Positioning System (GPS) for oa-orbit aavigation; and numerous upgrades 
to implement Extended Man-Teaded Capability to allow for much longer missions. Details regarding the changes 
to the software due to these hnrdwcue changes cannot be completely know until the hardware designs are 
completed. NASA has stated, however, that the upgrades will require changes to the ascent sofbvare, a new 
navigation program to process GPS data, aud additioas to the autoland program. 
Is These errors were classified as Severity 4 and Severity 5 errors since theiu resolution involved only changes 
to documentation rmd non-tlight software (i-e., the W S  compiler). However, had the issue not bsen addressed, 
and the potential of causing braaches to uakaown locatioas mmaiaed, a more severe situation could have occurred. 
ALTERNATTVES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF IV&V WITHIN NASA 
The primary reasons given by the Shuttle program office for wanting to eliminate the 
IV&V function, which they admit has been useful and effective, involve cost savings. The 
Committee has argued, in the previous section, that the cost versus benefit tradeoff justifies 
continued use of an appropriate form of IV&V. However, this does not address whether the 
same benefits could be achieved without using an IV&V contractor. This question of whether 
similar capability can be provided by organizations within NASA for lower cost prompted the 
Committee to investigate avenues other than the IV&V provided by Intermetrics and Smith 
Advanced Technologies. 
Various members of the flight software community provide some degree of independence 
and technical capability. In particular, the Safety and Mission Quality Office at NASA 
~ead~uarters' has the charter to oversee the safety and quality of Shuttle systems, including 
software. Accordingly, the Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance Office at Johnson Space 
Center has proposed a plan for taking over some, but not all, of the functions that are now 
performed as part of the IV&V effort. The Committee recognizes that the proposed plan is not 
meant to be a replacement for IV&V. The proposed plan emphasizes form over content and 
process over product. Under this plan, NASA personnel would check that the development 
contractor's processes were followed, but would not evaluate the software itself. Although such 
quality assurance activities can be valuable, they do not provide the same benefits as IV&V. 
A possible option, although not one that the Committee recommends, would be for the 
Safety and Mission Quality Office to take over all the functions currently being performed by 
the IV&V contractors and, thereby, provide the same service. There are two reasons why, in 
the opinion of the Committee, this is not a viable approach. 
First, the Committee was informed that neither the Safety and Mission Quality Office at 
Headquarters nor the Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance Office at Johnson Space Center 
have the personnel, the expertise, or the tools to replace the capabilities of the current IV&V 
effort. Thus, if an attempt were made to fully duplicate the IV&V function, there would 
necessarily be a significant time lag between the phase-out of the current IV&V function and the 
development of a corresponding capability elsewhere in the agency. For example, the plan 
presented to the Committee, which includes replacing only part of the current IV&V functions, 
will not be in place until well after the time when the current IV&V is scheduled to be 
eliminated. 
Second, if another organization within NASA were to attempt to duplicate the capabilities 
provided by the current N&V effort, they would be required to increase their personnel 
accordingly, develop or acquire software vedicatim and validation tools similar to those used 
by the IV&V tearns,l9 and provide appropriate facilities for housing the personnel and 
equipment. While the Committee was not constituted to evaluate the relative expense of 
l9 Intermetrics has acquired or developed nunmous tools specifically fix Shuttle software. These include tools 
tailored for the IV&V task that check cross-refem and data depedmies, compare source code listings, and 
identifiy absolute addresses. Intermekia also has several tools that apply to the specific programming languages 
(HAUS and -101 assembler) used in Shuttle software development. 
developing and maintaining such capability within NASA, it fails to see how making such a 
change could result in a net savings. 
The Committee was told that no organization within NASA has the expertise or the 
manpower to replace the current IV&V function in a timely fashion, and the Committee believes 
that building this expertise elsewhere will not necessarily reduce cost. Thus, the Committee 
does not recommend moving IV&V functions to other organizations within NASA unless 
the current IV&V is maintained for as long as it takes to build comparable expertise in the 
replacing organization. - 
~ased on evaluation of the presentations and documents given to the Committee, and 
considering the Committee's own industrial and academic experience and knowledge, the 
Committee concludes that the current IV&V process, as defined and practiced for the Space 
Shuttle software, is effective and that costJbenefit and risk considerations do not justify its 
elimination from the fiscal year 1993 budget. Furthermore, the Committee concludes that the 
Space Shuttle software development process is not adequate without current IV&V practices and 
their elimination will adversely affect the overall quality and safety of the software, both now 
and in the future. 
Accordingly, the Committee recommends that NASA: 
1. maintain the currently implemented independent verification and validation 
for Space Shuttle flight software; and 
2. not transfer IV&V functions to other organizations within the agency unless 
the current IV&V effort is maintained for as long as it takes to build 
comparable expertise in the replacing organization. 
Further recommendations regarding the development process for Shuttle flight software, 
including an evaluation of the embedded V&V process and a comparison with other, similar 
processes, will be contained in the Committee's final report. 

